UNITED
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S/21289
8 May 1990
ENGLISH
ORIGINAL: ARABIC

LETTER DATED 8 MAY 1990 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF IRAQ TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

On instructions from my Government and with reference to the Secretary-General's report to the Security Council on the United Nations Iran-Iraq Military Observer Group for the period 23 September 1989 to 22 March 1990 (S/21200), I have the honour to make the following comments concerning the contents of certain of the paragraphs contained in it.

1. On 20 October 1988, the competent Iraqi authorities notified UNIIMOG of their agreement to the opening of the three crossing points referred to in paragraph 14 of the report. In the same paragraph, a general observation is made to the effect that "there has been no progress" in the matter of the opening of the crossing points, which misrepresents Iraq's position on this question, whereas the fact is that the Iranian side was the one that did not agree to the opening of those crossing points in order to facilitate the movement of UNIIMOG personnel and vehicles on both sides of the cease-fire line.

2. The same is the case with regard to paragraph 20 of the report, inasmuch as the competent authorities notified UNIIMOG on 25 March 1989 of Iraq's agreement to the establishment of the mixed military working group, while Iran was the one which obstructed the meeting of this group.

3. In paragraph 21, it is stated that "the lack of freedom of movement allowed to UNIIMOG personnel in some locations on both sides continues to be a problem". Here too the expression is formulated generally and does not identify the party which is placing obstacles in the way of the freedom of movement of personnel in the locations. Iraq notified UNIIMOG on 29 July 1989 of its agreement to freedom of movement of personnel in the locations in question, while Iran did not agree to that.

I request you to have this letter circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Abdul Amir A. AL-ANBARI
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

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UNITED NATIONS

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General Assembly Security Council

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8 May 1990

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GENERAL ASSEMBLY
Forty-fifth session
Items 92, 103, 104, 109 and 113 of
the preliminary list*
EFFECTIVE IMPLEMENTATION OF UNITED NATIONS
INSTRUMENTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS AND EFFECTIVE
FUNCTIONING OF BODIES ESTABLISHED PURSUANT
TO SUCH INSTRUMENTS
CRIME PREVENTION AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE
ELIMINATION OF ALL FORMS OF DISCRIMINATION
AGAINST WOMEN
ELIMINATION OF ALL FORMS OF RELIGIOUS
INTOLERANCE
ENHANCING THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE PRINCIPLE
OF PERIODIC AND GENUINE ELECTIONS

SECURITY COUNCIL
Forty-fifth year

Letter dated 8 May 1990 from the Chargé d'affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of Israel to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

I have been instructed by my Government to draw your attention to the attached extract from Country Reports on Human Rights Practices For 1989, published by the Department of State of the United States of America, which contains information on the situation concerning human rights in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya (see annex). I have underlined passages of special relevance.

In view of the importance of this information, I have the honour to request that the present letter and its annex be issued as an official document of the General Assembly, under items 92, 103, 104, 109, and 113 of the preliminary list, and of the Security Council.

(Signed) Ephraim DOWEK
Ambassador
Deputy Permanent Representative
and Chargé d'affaires a.i.

* A/45/50.

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ANNEX*

101st Congress
2d Session

JOINT COMMITTEE PRINT

COUNTRY REPORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES FOR 1989

REPORT

SUBMITTED TO THE

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

AND THE

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
U.S. SENATE

BY THE

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

IN ACCORDANCE WITH SECTIONS 116(d) AND 502B(b) OF THE FOREIGN ASSISTANCE ACT OF 1961, AS AMENDED

FEBRUARY 1990

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* Underlining has been added by the Chargé d'affaires of the Permanent Mission of Israel to the United Nations.

READEX FICHE

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LIBYA*

The Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya is a dictatorship ruled by Colonel Mu'ammar Al-Qadhafi. He is aided by extragovernmental Revolutionary Committees which operate at his behest. The governing principles of the society are expressed in Col. Qadhafi's "Green Book" rather than in a constitution. He has created a political system borrowing from pan-Islamic and pan-Arab sources and purporting to establish a "third way" superior to both capitalism and communism. In the past, he has used assassination as one way to control his enemies abroad; he controls enemies at home in a variety of summary and judicial proceedings which are employed wherever popular resistance exists. Ethnic minorities, such as Berbers, are tightly controlled.

Libya maintains an extensive security apparatus, consisting of several elite military units, including Col. Qadhafi's personal bodyguards. The Revolutionary Committees and People's Committees also have security functions, designed to protect as well as monitor the populace. The result is multilayered, pervasive surveillance and control of individual activities. Although Col. Qadhafi announced his intention in 1988 to strip the Revolutionary Committees of some of their prerogatives over internal security, there is little evidence that he has done so.

Despite recent government efforts at privatization, the Libyan economy remains essentially state controlled and is based primarily on the country's rich oil resources, which are its principal source of foreign exchange earnings. Libya has used its oil income to finance internal development (new schools, hospitals, roads), but much has been wasted, and the decline in oil revenues has forced retrenchment. The foreign exchange controls Libya relaxed in 1988 were again tightened in 1989. Libya's economic difficulties have been exacerbated to some extent by the regime's expenditures for weapons and on foreign military adventures.

Major human rights restrictions and abuses continued in Libya in 1989. Legal freedoms and rights are generally lacking. As a practical matter, there are no effective rights to peaceful association or assembly, to freedom of speech, to expression of opposing views to the Government in any form, to formation of trade unions, or to strike. The same is true of rights such as the right to be considered innocent until proven guilty, to a public or speedy trial, to be secure in one's home or person, or even to hold property. While some of these rights are guaranteed in principle by the Libyan Government, there is no evidence that they exist in fact. Although Col. Qadhafi announced his support in 1988 for policies and reforms aimed at remedying past widespread abuses of human rights in Libya, there was little evidence of any significant change and many of the reforms do not appear to have been implemented.

Amnesty International (AI) estimates that over 90 political prisoners remained imprisoned at the end of 1988.

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*Since the U.S. has no official observers present in Libya and since Libya's media are totally controlled, this report draws heavily on unofficial sources.

LIBYA

RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS

Section 1 Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom from:

a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing

There were several reports of politically related and extrajudicial killings in 1989. Security forces were reported to have killed two or three persons and wounded others when they opened fire on a demonstration--in which anti-Qadhafi slogans were being shouted--in Tripoli in January 1989 (see Section 2.b.). A would-be assassin of Qadhafi was reported to have died of "shock" in police custody in May. There were unconfirmed reports that Islamist extremists opposed to the Government killed about a dozen nonbelievers in mosques in Tripoli in August. The mayor of Sirte is believed to have been killed for reasons of tribal politics in September. An Italian citizen was killed and his body burned by unknown assailants in October 1989 during a period of anti-Italian demonstrations fomented by the Libyan Government.

AI has expressed concern about the large number of offenses, including political offenses, which are punishable by death under Libyan law. For example, Law No. 71 of 1972 provides for the death penalty for anyone involved with any group activity based on any ideology opposed to the principles of the revolution (see also Section 1.e.). In 1988 Col. Qadhafi publicly stated his support for the abolition of the death penalty and promised to commute all existing death sentences. However, the Great Green Document on Human Rights adopted by the General People's Congress in 1988 merely identified the total abolition of the death penalty as an "aim of the society," and declared that the death penalty should be applied in those cases in which the accused poses a danger of corruption to the society.

In 1980 the Government instituted a policy of assassinations of Libyan exiles and announced the formation of "suicide squads" to hunt down and kill Libyan dissidents abroad. Between March 1980 and June 1987, AI recorded at least 37 attacks on Libyan opponents or presumed opponents living abroad, resulting in 25 deaths. In 1988 the regime invited exiles to return, promising they would not be in danger. Most refused to do so. There were no reliable reports of assassination attempts against Libyan exiles during 1989. According to AI's report for 1988, Col. Qadhafi indicated that the policy of "physical liquidation" of political opponents had ended.

b. Disappearance

There were no reports of disappearance in 1989.

c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment

No current information is available on this subject.

d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile

Under Libyan law, detainees may be held incommunicado for unlimited periods. Many political prisoners are held in unofficial detention centers controlled by members of the Revolutionary Committees, where prolonged periods of

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incommunicado detention are common. Many allegedly are held without charge or trial, apparently as an example to other would-be opponents of the regime. AI stated in a report in August 1989 that 40 people are reportedly in incommunicado detention following antigovernment disturbances between January and May, mainly at the universities in Tripoli and Benghazi. While undergoing interrogation, sometimes for periods of several months, prisoners are given no access to legal representation. Although Qadhafi has claimed to be opposed to secret arrests, there is still no evidence he has followed up with explicit orders to that end or that the situation has improved in practice. Foreigners have also been subject to arbitrary arrest in the past, and there are credible reports that some foreign workers in Libya have been forced into military training and military service on behalf of Libya or coerced into subversive activities against their own countries.

Exile is not a form of punishment practiced in Libya; to the contrary, Col. Qadhafi seeks to pressure Libyans working or studying abroad to return to Libya. Libya does, however, expel noncitizens arbitrarily.

With regard to forced or compulsory labor, see Section 6.c.

e. Denial of Fair Public Trial

Civilians may be tried in regular courts, in less formal "people's courts," or by military or revolutionary courts, depending on the arbitrary decision of the security forces. Security forces have the power to judge persons guilty without trial, particularly "traitors to the people." Trials are also held in private or in the absence of the accused. The traditional courts have been bypassed to a significant extent by people's courts and revolutionary courts which sometimes conducted "show trials" on television, followed by public executions, which have at times been televised. These various trial systems provide few safeguards.

A 1981 law prohibits the private practice of law and makes all attorneys employees of the Secretariat of Justice. The Union of Arab Lawyers, located in France, has expressed concern about the ability and freedom of attorneys to provide legal defense for political prisoners while serving as government employees. Libya claims that it "guarantees prisoners all necessary means of defense and safeguards of justice adequate to the principles contained in the [Universal] Declaration of Human Rights" and provides for legal assistance "as soon as possible with respect to the exigencies of interrogation." Nevertheless, there continue to be numerous reports that these rights are frequently denied.

Alleged political offenses in the past often have been tried before ad hoc revolutionary courts rather than by civilian courts, with the opportunities to engage defense counsel severely restricted. A number of these trials have been held in secret. The regime's announcement in 1988 of the abolition of all "extraordinary" courts, including those operated by the Revolutionary Committees, does not appear to have been implemented.

Some of the political prisoners known to be held in Libya were released in March 1988, and Col. Qadhafi declared that there were "less than 100" political detainees. In its 1989 Report, covering 1988, AI estimated the number at 90.

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f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or Correspondence

The Government does not respect the right to privacy. The legal requirement that judicial warrants must be obtained before entering a private home reportedly often is disregarded. Local and international telephone calls are routinely monitored. The informer network is extensive, encouraged by both security agencies and Revolutionary Committees. Libyan exiles report that mere family ties to suspected regime opponents can result in harassment or even persecution and detention by the authorities. Property can be seized and burned if it belongs to "enemies of the people" or those who "cooperate" with foreign powers.

Section 2 Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:

a. Freedom of Speech and Press

While some difference of opinion is tolerated in People's Committee meetings and at the General People's Congress, in general freedom of speech is severely limited. This is especially true with regard to any criticism of Col. Qadhafi or his regime. Fear of being informed upon by elements of the Revolutionary Committees and an underlying climate of mistrust at all levels of society further inhibit freedom of speech. Freedom of speech and other basic civil and political rights are further restricted during internal security crises.

Libyan media are owned and controlled by the State. There is a state-run daily newspaper, with a circulation of 40,000. Several smaller newspapers are run by the Revolutionary Committees and the Islamic Call Society. JANA, the official news agency, is the designated conduit for politically acceptable opinions. Publishing opinions contrary to government policy is not permitted. Foreign publications, once censored, now reportedly circulate sporadically in Tripoli.

b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association

Public assembly is repressed unless it is government controlled and supportive of regime positions. The right of association is limited and granted only to institutions affiliated with the regime. Organizations such as independent trade unions and professional associations are viewed as unnecessary, since Col. Qadhafi has vowed not to "accept intermediaries between the revolution and its working forces."

Following the last-minute cancellation of an international soccer match in Tripoli in January 1989, disappointed crowds reportedly demonstrated spontaneously in the streets, chanting "down with Qadhafi" and other slogans. Security forces fired on the crowds, reportedly killing two or three and wounding others. In a speech shortly thereafter, Col. Qadhafi indirectly acknowleged growing public opposition by calling for an end to "the demonstrations, the sit-ins, and the protests." He also called for an end to organized sports.

For a discussion of freedom of association as it applies to labor unions, see Section 6.a.

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c. Freedom of Religion

Libya is overwhelmingly Muslim. Some minority religions (e.g. Christianity) still are allowed to conduct services, but Islamic groups at variance with the state-sanctioned version are banned. In an apparent effort to eliminate any alternative power bases, the regime has banned the once-powerful Sanusiyya Islamic religious sect.

Services in Christian churches are attended by the foreign community. There is a resident Catholic bishop and a small number of priests. Nuns reportedly are permitted to wear religious habits.

d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel, Emigration, and Repatriation

With the exception of security areas, movement is not usually restricted for Libyan citizens. Traditionally, exit permits have been required for travel abroad, and currency controls have also served to restrict travel. Restrictions on travel abroad were eased significantly in 1988, but the restrictions on currency imposed in late 1989 had the practical effect of again curbing travel. Members of the Revolutionary Committees maintain surveillance of some Libyans while abroad. The right of return of Libyan nationals is theoretically fully protected even for opponents of Col. Qadhafi, so long as they are prepared to "repent." However, this "right" often appears to be more nearly an obligation; the regime often calls for students, many of whom are under government subsidy, and others working abroad to return on little or no notice and without regard to the impact on their studies or work. Libyans who study abroad are interrogated on their return home. Not surprisingly, a number of those called on to return resist.

Section 3 Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to Change Their Government

The people of Libya have no right to change their government. Major government decisions are controlled by Col. Qadhafi himself, a few key figures around him, or by committees acting in his name. He appoints military officers and official functionaries down to junior levels. Power flows through a small circle of trusted associates. Corruption in the administration is a major problem, adversely affecting the efficiency of government.

Participation in elections is mandatory, and all candidates are cleared by the Revolutionary Committees from among persons who are not "merchants, contractors, tribal advocates, election brokers, officials of the former (pre-1969) government, or people who have been attacked by the power of the revolution." Political parties and tribal or local groupings are prohibited.

Section 4 Governmental Attitude Regarding International and Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human Rights

There are no independent human rights organizations in Libya to monitor the Government's performance. The Libyan Arab Human Rights Committee, a government organization, was created in May 1989, reportedly to implement the reforms announced in

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1988. AI was allowed to visit Libya in 1988 and meet with political, judicial, and security officials.

Section 5 Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Language, or Social Status

There are frequent allegations of discrimination based on tribal status, with particular discrimination alleged against Berbers in the interior and Tuaregs in the south. Col. Qadhafi has often complained about the continued power of tribal and other groups, but he also utilizes them for political action when he sponsors proregime demonstrations. In past years, he sought unsuccessfully to assure that Berbers married only non-Berbers, presumably in an effort to erode their tribal identity.

The conservative cultural attitudes of Libya's Islamic society serve to restrict the rights of certain groups, most notably women. Within the confines of Islam, Col. Qadhafi has led efforts to change the status of women and expand their access to educational and employment opportunities. Women currently receive basic military training and are subject to the military draft, with some exceptions. The husband's permission is necessary for women or children to travel abroad. Female circumcision is still reportedly practiced among tribal groups in remote areas of the south. No information is available on the extent to which violence against women is a problem in Libya.

Section 6 Worker Rights

a. The Right of Association

Workers do not have the right to form or join unions of their own choosing. The official trade union organization, the General Federation of Producers' Trade Unions, which was created in 1972, is under government control and administered through the People's Committee system. Independent trade unions and professional associations are viewed as unnecessary, since Col. Qadhafi has vowed not to accept intermediaries between the revolution and its working forces. Although unions are assured the right to "safeguard their interests," there is no right to strike, and no strikes by Libyan workers have been reported for years.

With government financing, the official trade union organization plays a leading role in the International Confederation of Arab Trade Unions and the Organization of African Trade Union Unity and exploits international trade union contacts to engage in propaganda efforts on behalf of the Government. Libya is a member of the International Labor Organization (ILO). It ratified ILO Convention 98 on the Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively in 1962 (under the previous regime), but it has not ratified Convention 87 on Freedom of Association.

b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively

Although the Libyan Labor Code provides for collective agreements, there is no collective bargaining in Libya. The ILO's Committee of Experts (COE), for a number of years including 1989, has noted that the conditions which are laid down in the Labor Code for the validity of collective agreements are contrary to provisions of ILO Convention 98

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requiring free and voluntary negotiation of collective agreements.

c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor

Libya has ratified the two ILO Conventions dealing with forced labor. The ILO's COE, in its 1989 Report, noted that "persons expressing certain political views or views ideologically opposed to the established political, social or economic system may be punished with penalties of imprisonment... involving...an obligation to perform labor." It also noted that public employees in Libya can be imprisoned and sentenced to compulsory labor "...as a punishment for breaches of labour discipline or for participation in strikes even in services whose interruption would not endanger the life, personal safety, or health of the whole or part of the population."

d. Minimum Age for Employment of Children

No information is available regarding employment of children in Libya. In general, there is no evidence that child labor is a widespread practice.

e. Acceptable Conditions of Work

Libya maintains a work force of around 1 million workers in a population of 3.7 million. There is no minimum wage rate set by law. The legal maximum workweek is 48 hours. Libyan labor law defines the rights and duties of workers, and such aspects as compensation, pension rights, minimum rest periods, and length of the workday. Information on health and safety standards is not available.

Libyan labor law does not apply to the 300,000 foreign workers in Libya, who do much of the blue-collar and technical work. Their permission to stay in the country extends only for the duration of the contracts under which they are employed. Foreign workers are subject to arbitrary pressures, such as changes in work rules and contracts, with little option but to accept or to depart the country, often without full compensation for work already performed. The conditions of their employment are subject to negotiation between the worker and the employer. Foreign workers who are not under contract enjoy no protection and in past years have been expelled for such infractions as supporting or organizing strikes.

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LETTER DATED 8 MAY 1990 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF IRAQ TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

On instructions from my Government, I have the honour to inform you that the Iranian armed forces have committed the following violations of the cease-fire:

1. At 2150 hours on 20 April 1990, an Iranian column consisting of seven vehicles was observed advancing from the rear to the Iranian positions east of the Doveyrich river at co-ordinates 438829, 462801 and 484786, opposite Cham Hendi and Makhfar Baray and within the general area of the Iranian positions, 3-7 kilometres from our IV Army Corps units.

2. At 0630 hours on 21 April 1990, an Iranian engineering unit consisting of a bulldozer and 10 dump trucks was seen strengthening an embankment at co-ordinates 668156, 1,100 metres from our VII Army Corps units.

3. At 0700 hours on 21 April 1990, an Iranian engineering unit consisting of an excavator and seven dump trucks was seen strengthening an embankment at co-ordinates 549349, 1,100 metres from our VII Army Corps units.

4. At 0920 hours on 21 April 1990, an Iranian engineering unit consisting of an excavator, a grader and 10 dump trucks was seen mending an embankment at co-ordinates 385585, 700 metres from our VII Army Corps units.

5. At 0940 hours on 21 April 1990, five Iranian dump trucks were seen raising the level of an embankment at co-ordinates 373595, 600 metres from our VII Army Corps units.

6. At 1100 hours on 21 April 1990, three Iranian dump trucks were seen carrying earth to the embankment at co-ordinates 283688, 500 metres from our VII Army Corps units.

7. At 2315 hours on 21 April 1990, the Iranians fired 10 shots from a medium-range machine-gun in the direction of the I Army Corps, 38th Brigade, sector from the hill 2231 area at co-ordinates 697628, 1,800 metres from the units of the above-mentioned Army Corps.

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8. At 1230 hours on 22 April 1990, an Iranian bulldozer was seen building a mound south of hill 2039 within the Iranian positions at co-ordinates 733635, 1,300 metres from our I Army Corps units. The circumference of the mound is estimated at 15 metres and its height at 2 metres.

9. At 1000 hours on 22 April 1990, the Iranians dug three positions inside their positions south of the Kanjan dam at co-ordinates 139698, 2,000 metres from our II Army Corps units. The distance between each position and the next is 15 metres.

10. At 0700 hours on 22 April 1990, an Iranian engineering unit consisting of a grader and six dump trucks was seen strengthening the embankment at co-ordinates 548257, 800 metres from our VII Army Corps units.

11. At 0900 hours on 22 April 1990, an Iranian engineering unit consisting of a bulldozer and three dump trucks was seen mending the embankment at co-ordinates 283688, 600 metres from our VII Army Corps units.

12. At 0930 hours on 22 April 1990, an Iranian engineering unit consisting of an excavator and seven dump trucks was seen mending the embankment at co-ordinates 385587, 600 metres from our VII Army Corps units.

13. At 1225 hours on 22 April 1990, a column consisting of six vehicles was observed coming from the Iranian rear and entering the Iranian embankment west of Shuja' at co-ordinates 505695, 3,000 metres from our IV Army Corps units.

14. At 1240 hours on 23 April 1990, the Iranians erected a 14-metre-long dual-strand barbed wire fence with seven uprights around the Iranian post at co-ordinates 635204, 250 metres from our II Army Corps units.

15. At 1600 hours on 23 April 1990, the Iranians continued, for the fifteenth successive day, the operations of the engineering unit consisting of eight dump trucks, two bulldozers, an excavator and a fork-lift on the improvement and rearrangement of its defensive position in the Curve area at co-ordinates 582721, 1,200 metres from our VI Army Corps units.

16. At 0650 hours on 23 April 1990, nine dump trucks were seen carrying earth to the embankment at co-ordinates 547251, 800 metres from our VII Army Corps units.

17. At 0650 hours on 23 April 1990, an Iranian engineering unit consisting of an excavator and eight dump trucks was seen strengthening an embankment at co-ordinates 669155, 1,100 metres from our VII Army Corps units.

18. At 0850 hours on 23 April 1990, an Iranian engineering unit consisting of an excavator and five dump trucks was seen removing earth from the Shatt al-Arab at co-ordinates 358595, 600 metres from our VII Army Corps units.

19. At 0900 hours on 23 April 1990, an Iranian engineering unit consisting of an excavator and three dump trucks was seen strengthening an embankment at co-ordinates 281693, 600 metres from our VII Army Corps units.

20. At 1000 hours on 23 April 1990, a fork-lift was seen positioning six semicircular concrete sections to the rear of the embankment on Hajj Salbukh island at co-ordinates 308594, 700 metres from our VII Army Corps units.

21. At 0900 hours on 24 April 1990, an Iranian engineering unit was seen operating on the spit extending from the Iranian rampart to the Iranian ambush position in no man's land at co-ordinates 920971, 1,900 metres from our III Army Corps units.

22. At 1600 hours on 24 April 1990, the Iranians continued, for the sixteenth successive day, the operations of the engineering unit consisting of eight dump trucks and four excavators on the improvement and rearrangement of its defensive position at co-ordinates 582721, 1,200 metres from our VI Army Corps units.

23. At 0710 hours on 24 April 1990, an Iranian engineering unit consisting of an excavator, a grader and six dump trucks was strengthening the embankment at co-ordinates 547251, 900 metres from our VII Army Corps units.

24. At 0850 hours on 24 April 1990, an Iranian engineering unit consisting of an excavator and a dump truck was seen strengthening the embankment at co-ordinates 283689, 600 metres from our VII Army Corps units.

25. At 1630 hours on 24 April 1990, the Iranians set up a camp at the Dukan garrison at co-ordinates 395885, 6,500 metres from our I Army Corps units. The camp comprises between 30 and 33 tents and flies the Iranian flag. Twenty-five Iranian armed forces personnel were seen levelling the ground over a distance of 30 metres at the crossroads in the garrison itself.

26. At 0725 hours on 24 April 1990, an Iranian engineering unit consisting of a Poclain excavator and two dump trucks was seen removing a portion of the earth spit at co-ordinates 945802, 500 metres from our III Army Corps units.

27. At 1910 hours on 24 April 1990, the Iranians built an unroofed firing position of sandbags on the first Iranian embankment at co-ordinates 984755, 1,000 metres from our III Army Corps units.

28. At 0805 hours on 25 April 1990, the Iranians set up a 20-metre-long line of cork sections on the section of road that was stripped on 19 March 1990 at co-ordinates 943818, 500 metres from our III Army Corps units.

29. On 25 April 1990, conspicuous activity due to the movement of Iranian boats estimated to number 13 was observed in no man's land north of the Dasm dam in the restricted zone between co-ordinates 1562715 and 605684, 2,000 to 2,500 metres from our VI Army Corps units.

30. On 25 April 1990, the Iranians were still continuing the operations of the engineering unit consisting of eight dump trucks and four excavators in the Curve area at co-ordinates 582721 in the VI Army Corps zone.

31. At 0730 hours on 25 April 1990, an Iranian engineering unit consisting of two excavators, a bulldozer and 10 dump trucks was seen mending an embankment at co-ordinates 547254, 800 metres from our VII Army Corps units.

32. At 0915 hours on 25 April 1990, an Iranian engineering unit consisting of an excavator, a bulldozer and six dump trucks was seen unloading earth into the southern Abadan channel at co-ordinates 357596, 700 metres from our VII Army Corps units.

33. At 0925 hours on 25 April 1990, an Iranian engineering unit consisting of an excavator and five dump trucks was seen levelling earth on the embankment at co-ordinates 368595, 700 metres from our VII Army Corps units.

34. At 1400 hours on 25 April 1990, a fork-lift was seen positioning three concrete pipes to the rear of the earth rampart on Hajj Salbukh island at co-ordinates 308594, 700 metres from our VII Army Corps units.

35. At 1900 hours on 25 April 1990, the Iranians completed the ground link between the southern Abadan channel and Hajj Salbukh island at co-ordinates 357597, 800 metres from our VII Army Corps units.

36. Between 15 and 25 April 1990, the Iranians dug a slit trench with a Poclain excavator north of Musian. The trench is 2,900 metres long and passes through co-ordinates 238058, 245053, 242050, 249044, 247044, 245046, 241048 and 239049, inside the Iranians' positions and 4,000 to 5,000 metres from our IV Army Corps units.

37. On 26 April 1990, conspicuous activity due to the movement of Iranian boats estimated to number eight was observed in no man's land south of the Dasm dam at co-ordinates 523747, 588706, 592736, 589724 and 585757, 1,000 to 2,000 metres from our VI Army Corps units.

38. On 26 April 1990, the Iranians continued the operations of the engineering unit consisting of eight dump trucks, three bulldozers and two excavators in the Curve area at co-ordinates 582721, 1,200 metres from our VI Army Corps units.

39. At 0700 hours on 26 April 1990, an Iranian engineering unit consisting of an excavator and eight dump trucks was seen strengthening an embankment at co-ordinates 674154, 1,300 metres from our VII Army Corps units.

40. At 0930 hours on 26 April 1990, an Iranian engineering unit consisting of an excavator and five dump trucks was seen carrying earth to the bridge linking the southern Abadan channel with Hajj Salbukh island at co-ordinates 357596, 700 metres from our VII Army Corps units.

41. At 1820 hours on 26 April 1990, an Iranian excavator was seen raising the height of the earth embankment at co-ordinates 249717, 600 metres from our VII Army Corps units.

42. At 1100 hours on 27 April 1990, an Iranian bulldozer was seen building a 10-metre-long embankment at the Iranian mound north of the village of Kaivard at co-ordinates 547728, 2,500 metres from our I Army Corps units.

43. On 27 April 1990, conspicuous activity due to the movement of nine Iranian boats was observed in no man's land north and south of the Dasm dam at co-ordinates 589718, 606713, 593741, 597755, 605743, 593782 and 604735 and in two cases at co-ordinates 598724, 1,000 to 2,000 metres from our VI Army Corps units.

44. On 27 April 1990, the Iranians were still continuing, for the nineteenth successive day, the operations of the engineering unit in the Curve area, at co-ordinates 582721, 1,200 metres from our VI Army Corps units.

45. At 0630 hours on 27 April 1990, an Iranian engineering unit consisting of an overburden excavator and five dump trucks was seen strengthening an embankment at co-ordinates 681154, 1,400 metres from our VII Army Corps units.

46. At 0710 hours on 27 April 1990, an Iranian engineering unit consisting of an excavator and four dump trucks was seen strengthening an embankment at co-ordinates 548247, 900 metres from our VII Army Corps units.

47. At 1610 hours on 27 April 1990, four dump trucks were seen carrying earth from the rear to the embankment at co-ordinates 547235, 800 metres from our VII Army Corps units.

48. At 1945 hours on 27 April 1990, an Iranian grader was seen levelling the forward embankment at co-ordinates 365595, 900 metres from our VII Army Corps units.

49. At 0830 hours on 28 April 1990, a white-coloured Iranian helicopter was observed coming from the Saddamiyah area to Al-Asghar at an altitude of 200 to 300 metres and returning on the same flight to the Iranian rear, 10 to 12 kilometres from our IV Army Corps units.

50. On 28 April 1990, conspicuous activity due to the movement of nine Iranian boats was observed in no man's land north and south of the Dasm dam at co-ordinates 598747, 588759, 587767 and 589768 and in two instances at co-ordinates 594733 and 593758, 1,000 to 2,000 metres from our VI Army Corps units.

51. At 0630 hours on 28 April 1990, an Iranian engineering unit consisting of an excavator and six dump trucks was seen strengthening an embankment at co-ordinates 669155, 1,100 metres from our VII Army Corps units.

52. At 0745 hours on 28 April 1990, an Iranian engineering unit consisting of an excavator and four dump trucks was seen strengthening an embankment at co-ordinates 548244, 900 metres from our VII Army Corps units.

53. At 1630 hours on 28 April 1990, the Iranians built a one-square-metre guard post of sandbags at co-ordinates 517399, 700 metres from our VII Army Corps units.

54. At 1630 hours on 28 April 1990, five Iranians were seen setting up a single-barrel machine-gun at co-ordinates 65561, 2,000 metres from our V Army Corps units.

55. At 1000 hours on 29 April 1990, the Iranians set up a single-barrel machine-gun at co-ordinates 64535, 2,000 metres from our V Army Corps units.

56. On 29 April 1990, conspicuous activity due to the movement of three Iranian boats was observed in no man's land north and south of the Dasm dam at co-ordinates 587738, 596718 and 603745, 1,000 to 2,000 metres from our VI Army Corps units.

57. At 0830 hours on 29 April 1990, the Iranians set up a single-barrel machine-gun near the Iranian observation post in the Curve area at co-ordinates 582721, 1,200 metres from our VI Army Corps units.

58. At 0630 hours on 29 April 1990, an Iranian engineering unit consisting of an excavator and five dump trucks was seen strengthening an embankment at co-ordinates 669155, 1,100 metres from our VII Army Corps units.

59. At 0700 hours on 29 April 1990, an Iranian engineering unit consisting of an excavator and eight dump trucks was seen strengthening an embankment at co-ordinates 548237, 900 metres from our VII Army Corps units.

60. At 0915 hours on 29 April 1990, an Iranian engineering unit consisting of a grader, a roller and three dump trucks was seen carrying earth from the rear to the forward embankment and mending the road parallel to the Shatt al-Arab at co-ordinates 413552, 700 metres from our VII Army Corps units.

61. At 0940 hours on 29 April 1990, an Iranian engineering unit consisting of an excavator and four dump trucks was seen carrying earth from the rear to the bridge connecting the southern Abadan channel with Hajj Salbukh Island and raising the height of an earth rampart at co-ordinates 357596, 700 metres from our VII Army Corps units.

62. At 0940 hours on 29 April 1990, an Iranian engineering unit consisting of three graders, a roller and a bulldozer was seen levelling an embankment at co-ordinates 404565, 700 metres from our VII Army Corps units.

63. At 1700 hours on 29 April 1990, three bulldozers were seen strengthening the road linking the first Iranian embankment with the Iranian monitoring zone at co-ordinates 920971, 1,600 metres from our VII Army Corps units.

64. At 0840 hours on 30 April 1990, the Iranians built a guard post of sandbags on the spit extending in front of the first Iranian embankment at co-ordinates 943811, 300 metres from our III Army Corps units.

65. At 0645 hours on 30 April 1990, an Iranian engineering unit consisting of an excavator and six dump trucks was seen strengthening an embankment at co-ordinates 547235, 800 metres from our VII Army Corps units.

66. At 0715 hours on 30 April 1990, five Iranians were seen improving and fortifying a guard post of sandbags at co-ordinates 563202, 700 metres from our VII Army Corps units.

67. At 0940 hours on 30 April 1990, an Iranian engineering unit consisting of an excavator and three dump trucks was seen carrying earth from the rear to the southern Abadan channel bridge at co-ordinates 357596, 700 metres from our VII Army Corps units.

68. At 1930 hours on 30 April 1990, the Iranians pitched a tent north of hill 1756 at co-ordinates 706646, 1,500 metres from our I Army Corps units.

69. At 1825 hours on 30 April 1990, the Iranians built a guard post of blocks at co-ordinates 927846, 500 metres from our III Army Corps units.

70. At 1835 hours on 30 April 1990, a group of Iranians estimated to number 20, with pick-up trucks, a motor cycle and a motor boat carrying a single-barrel machine-gun, was seen loading the trucks with block sections from the old Iranian positions and carrying them towards the rear in the direction of the Iranian observation post. The Iranian flag was also raised. The above took place at co-ordinates 581599, 1,330 metres from our VI Army Corps units.

Flooding operation

The Iranian side is continuing its flooding operation in the direction of our III Army Corps opposite the defensive positions of our military units. The water levels have been as follows:

71. 21 April 1990

Between co-ordinates 678327 and 902203, 0-80 centimetres;
Between co-ordinates 902203 and 902904, 35-160 centimetres;
Between co-ordinates 902904 and 989731, 8-140 centimetres.

72. 22 April 1990

Between co-ordinates 678327 and 902203, 0-80 centimetres;
Between co-ordinates 902203 and 902904, 30-160 centimetres;
Between co-ordinates 902904 and 989731, 8-140 centimetres.

73. 23 April 1990

Between co-ordinates 678327 and 902203, 0-80 centimetres;
Between co-ordinates 902203 and 902904, 30-160 centimetres;
Between co-ordinates 902904 and 989731, 5-135 centimetres.

74. 24 April 1990

Between co-ordinates 678327 and 902203, 0-80 centimetres;
Between co-ordinates 902203 and 902904, 30-160 centimetres;
Between co-ordinates 902904 and 989731, 5-135 centimetres.

75. 25 April 1990

Between co-ordinates 678327 and 902203, 0-80 centimetres;
Between co-ordinates 902203 and 902904, 25-157 centimetres;
Between co-ordinates 902904 and 989731, 5-135 centimetres.

76. 26 April 1990

Between co-ordinates 678327 and 902203, 0-80 centimetres;
Between co-ordinates 902203 and 902904, 25-157 centimetres;
Between co-ordinates 902904 and 989731, 5-130 centimetres.

77. 27 April 1990

Between co-ordinates 678327 and 902203, 0-80 centimetres;
Between co-ordinates 902203 and 902904, 30-155 centimetres;
Between co-ordinates 902904 and 989731, 5-130 centimetres.

78. 28 April 1990

Between co-ordinates 678327 and 902203, 0-80 centimetres;
Between co-ordinates 902203 and 902904, 30-155 centimetres;
Between co-ordinates 902904 and 989731, 3-130 centimetres.

79. 29 April 1990

Between co-ordinates 678327 and 902203, 0-80 centimetres;
Between co-ordinates 902203 and 902904, 30-155 centimetres;
Between co-ordinates 902904 and 989731, 3-130 centimetres.

80. 30 April 1990

Between co-ordinates 678327 and 902203, 0-85 centimetres;
Between co-ordinates 902203 and 902904, 30-150 centimetres;
Between co-ordinates 902904 and 989731, 30-130 centimetres.

I should be grateful if you would have this letter circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Abdul Amir A. AL-ANBARI
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

UNITED
NATIONS

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General Assembly Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

A/44/945
S/21292
9 May 1990

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

GENERAL ASSEMBLY
Forty-fourth session
Agenda item 47
QUESTION OF CYPRUS

SECURITY COUNCIL
Forty-fifth year

Letter dated 9 May 1990 from the Permanent Representative of Turkey to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

I have the honour to attach herewith a letter dated 9 May 1990 addressed to you by His Excellency Mr. Özer Koray, representative of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus.

I should be grateful if the present letter and its annex were circulated as a document of the forty-fourth session of the General Assembly, under agenda item 47, and of the Security Council.

(Signed) Mustafa AKSIN
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

ANNEX

Letter dated 9 May 1990 from Mr. Özer Koray to the Secretary-General

I have the honour to refer to the document of the General Assembly and the Security Council dated 24 April 1990 (A/44/938-S/21265) containing the letter of Mr. Mavrommatis, the representative of the Greek Cypriots, complaining about my request to have the views of my Government on the question of Cyprus made known to the membership of the General Assembly and the Security Council.

I do not need to recall that the question of Cyprus is going to be settled as a result of direct talks between the leaders of the two Cypriot sides negotiating freely with one another on a footing of equality under the aegis of the Secretary-General's mission of good offices. This being the case, both sides have the same right to have their views on the question of Cyprus presented to the General Assembly and the Security Council. A reading of Security Council resolution 649 (1990) will bear out the correctness of what I am saying.

While objecting to the presentation of my Government's views on the resolution on Cyprus adopted by the European Parliament on 15 March 1990 on the ground that it is a body outside of the structure of the United Nations, Mr. Mavrommatis then goes on to have the full text of this same resolution circulated as an annex to his letter of 23 April 1990.

Just how flawed this resolution is can be gathered from its 10th preambular paragraph which reads: "Believing that the vast majority of Turkish Cypriots also deplore the spoiling tactics of Mr. Denktas." On 22 April 1990, presidential elections were held in the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus and Mr. Denktas was a candidate for president along with two other candidates. Mr. Denktas received 66.7 per cent of the votes. The vast majority of Turkish Cypriots, over two thirds in fact, gave their support to Mr. Denktas and re-elected him President of the Republic for a further term of five years.

I should also like to recall that paragraph 5 of Security Council resolution 649 (1990) "calls on the parties concerned to refrain from any action that could aggravate the situation". The Greek Cypriot attempts to create an artificial climate of tension and hysteria on the island, the campaign of disinformation being waged against the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, the economic blockade, the travel restrictions, the frenzied rearmament efforts, the support for shady groups with terrorist links are all hostile actions directed against the Turkish Cypriots which are making it more difficult for the two parts of Cyprus to reconcile their differences and form a federation. It is also making it more difficult for the Secretary-General to carry out his mission of good offices.

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General Assembly Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

A/45/272
S/21293
9 May 1990

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

GENERAL ASSEMBLY
Forty-fifth session
Items 12, 92, 103 and 113 of the
preliminary list*
REPORT OF THE ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COUNCIL
EFFECTIVE IMPLEMENTATION OF UNITED
NATIONS INSTRUMENTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS
AND EFFECTIVE FUNCTIONING OF BODIES
ESTABLISHED PURSUANT TO SUCH
INSTRUMENTS
CRIME PREVENTION AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE
ENHANCING THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE
PRINCIPLE OF PERIODIC AND GENUINE
ELECTIONS

SECURITY COUNCIL
Forty-fifth year

Letter dated 9 May 1990 from the Chargé d'affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of Israel to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

I have been instructed by my Government to draw your attention to the attached extract from Country Reports on Human Rights Practices For 1989, published by the Department of State of the United States of America, which contains information on the situation concerning human rights in Democratic Yemen. I have underlined passages of special relevance.

In view of the importance of this information, I have the honour to request that the present letter and the attached extract be issued as an official document of the General Assembly, under items 12, 92, 103, and 113 of the preliminary list, and of the Security Council.

(Signed) Ephraim DOWEK
Ambassador
Deputy Permanent Representative
and Chargé d'affaires a.i.

* A/45/50.

PEOPLE'S DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF YEMEN

The People's Democratic Republic of Yemen (PDRY) is one-party state governed by the avowedly Marxist Yemeni Socialist Party (YSP). President Haidar Abu Bakr al-Attas came to power in January 1986, following the violent overthrow of President Ali Nasir Muhammad al-Hasani, who continues to live in exile in the Yemen Arab Republic (YAR). The current regime has purged the Government and YSP of Ali Nasir supporters. The efforts of the YSP to establish a Marxist-Leninist state along Soviet administrative lines have overwhelmed some traditional social and cultural values. An estimated 25 percent of the population has departed the PDRY, mostly to the YAR, since the country gained independence from Great Britain in 1967. In 1989 the ruling party debated political and economic reforms that would more clearly distinguish between party and state, allow a degree of economic incentives to employers and employees, modify the legal system, streamline administrative structures, and permit multiple political parties. While meeting in Aden on November 30, 1989, YSP Secretary General al-Bidh and YAR President Salih ratified a 1981 draft constitution for a unified Yemeni state. The two leaders agreed to submit the constitution to the PDRY and YAR legislative authorities for ratification within 6 months and then to the Yemeni people for approval in a referendum during the following 6 months.

The Ministry for State Security is charged with overseeing internal security operations. The army, regional militias, and the police play subsidiary roles, but in some areas tribal authority effectively supersedes government rules and regulations.

Approximately 40 percent of the 2.3 million inhabitants work as farmers, and their crops account for about 12 percent of the gross national product. The economy remains hampered by severe shortages of basic consumer items and commodities. The Government continues to regulate most sectors of the economy and makes it difficult for even PDRY citizens to import capital. Small shops and service industries remain privately owned and operated. In 1989 the Government allowed limited private ownership of dwellings for the first time in many years. The Government also expressed interest in attracting Western investment and technology, particularly in the oil and mineral resources sector.

The human rights situation overall remains grim, with many rights, such as freedom of speech, association, and the press, sharply curtailed. Other problem areas are abuse of prisoners and detainees, arbitrary arrest and incommunicado detention, lack of fair trial, and inability of citizens to change their government. There appeared to be some modest improvements in 1989, continuing the trend observable over the past three years. Some PDRY citizens believe that the improvement--in particular, liberalized travel measures and a somewhat freer press--is the result of internal pressure on PDRY officials to follow the liberalizing trend in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. The regime issued an amnesty for all but the top Ali Nasir supporters with the proclaimed goal of promoting

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*The United States maintains no diplomatic mission in the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen, which severed diplomatic relations with the United States in 1969. It is difficult, therefore, to comment authoritatively on conditions in that country.

PEOPLE'S DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF YEMEN

national reconciliation.

RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS

Section 1 Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom from:

a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing

The Ali Nasir exile movement's YAR-based newspaper and an affiliated human rights committee charged the PDRY with the politically motivated killing of several PDRY citizens, including military officers and government officials. The movement regularly accuses the PDRY of political killings, but there is no independent confirmation of these accusations.

b. Disappearance

There were continuing reports of disappearances. As in the past, some apparently were the result of tribal and factional infighting.

c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment

Amnesty International (AI) and the Arab Organization for Human Rights (AOHR) noted in their 1989 reports the deaths in custody of three persons under circumstances strongly suggesting ill-treatment had caused the deaths. The Ali Nasir exile movement and an affiliated committee frequently charge that torture is still practiced by PDRY security services. There is no independent confirmation of these charges.

d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile

Incommunicado detention and arbitrary arrests are common. A committee affiliated with the Ali Nasir exile movement identified 23 persons, including some exiles who had returned from North Yemen under a general amnesty first announced in March 1986, who were detained in 1989 without charges. There was no independent confirmation of this allegation. In its 1989 Report covering 1988, AI notes it repeatedly expressed concern about the detention without trial of suspected government opponents.

With regard to forced or compulsory labor, see Section 6.c.

e. Denial of Fair Public Trial

Many persons are believed to have been imprisoned without trial. Legal procedures for the protection of the accused are routinely ignored or manipulated as in the case of the 1987 show trials of former President Ali Nasir and his followers. The Ali Nasir exile movement charged the PDRY Government with conducting a show trial in 1989 of 14 persons charged with treason before the same judges who convicted and sentenced to death other Ali Nasir supporters in 1987. A committee affiliated with the movement further charged the Government with conducting a show trial of four pilots of Yemda, the national airline. There was no independent confirmation of either allegation.

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PEOPLE'S DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF YEMEN

f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or Correspondence

National security is frequently cited as the justification for the pervasive invasion of personal privacy. PDRY security services routinely inspect mail, tap telephones, and arbitrarily search residences and businesses.

Section 2 Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:

a. Freedom of Speech and Press

Freedom of speech and press is severely restricted. The state-owned electronic media and party newspaper faithfully reflect government views and priorities. In 1989 the state-controlled press reportedly allowed more extensive debate and airing of opinions on draft party and government political and economic reforms. PDRY citizens visiting the YAR have commented that the press appears to be somewhat freer than in previous years.

b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association

No public or professional associations, except those sponsored by the State or party, are permitted to operate openly. Unauthorized gatherings are forbidden.

For a discussion of freedom of association as it applies to labor unions, see Section 6.a.

c. Freedom of Religion

The Constitution declares that Islam is the state religion and provides for freedom of religious expression. In practice, however, the Government attempts to minimize the influence of religious leaders, and some sermons for Friday prayer are reportedly provided by the Ministry of Religious Affairs. A small Christian community of Indian origin exists in Aden and is allowed to practice its religion.

d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel, Emigration, and Repatriation

There are some restricted areas in the PDRY, but there were said to be fewer checkpoints on major roads and near the capital in 1989 than there were in 1988. The two Yemens implemented a new accord in 1988 which permits citizens of each country to enter the other by presenting only a national identification card. In November 1989 the PDRY revoked the requirement of obtaining prior police permission for South Yemenis wishing to travel to North Yemen. For the first time in their acrimonious relationship, the border between the two countries is basically open to all Yemenis. Many PDRY citizens have taken advantage of this accord to visit relatives and shop in the YAR. Approximately 60,000 South Yemenis have fled to the YAR since the January 1986 coup. In 1989 as many as 5,000 Ali Nasir exiles may have returned to the south under the general amnesty first announced in 1986 and reiterated several times since. However, counterbalancing this movement south across the YAR/PDRY border was the movement north of approximately 5,000 wives, children, and other relatives of Ali Nasir supporters who were in exile in the YAR.

Regulations governing travel to other countries reportedly

PEOPLE'S DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF YEMEN

have also been liberalized. The YSP Politburo approved in November 1989 the lifting of former requirements on foreign travel such as prior police permits, family letters of invitation, exit permits, and travel bonds. Whether other requirements remain is unknown.

Section 3 Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to Change Their Government

The PDRY has no democratic institutions, and ordinary citizens do not have the ability peacefully to change their leaders or the system of government. Political parties, other than the YSP, are banned, and the YSP dominates politics. Other organizations, such as the military and, to a lesser extent, the National Democratic Front (NDF), also play prominent roles. The NDF consists largely of northern Yemenis who waged a guerrilla insurgency against the YAR until 1982; now it is one of several principal factions competing for influence in Aden. Alliances are often based on tribal or regional affiliations; natives of Aden are largely unrepresented in the senior ranks of the YSP.

The Constitution provides for universal suffrage for those over the age of 18, but only candidates approved by the YSP may run for election. An election reform law, reportedly allowing candidates independent of the YSP, self-nominated candidates, and multiple candidates was enacted in 1989. A number of independent candidates competed with YSP candidates in local council elections conducted in November under the new law. The ruling party also announced its agreement in principle to permit multiple political parties and instructed the YSP Politburo to draft a new political parties law. Overall, politics in the PDRY are characterized by violence and coercion. Leading members of the losing faction can often expect imprisonment, exile, or death.

Section 4 Governmental Attitude Regarding International and Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human Rights

Although AI, AOHR, and other human rights groups attempt to monitor the situation in the PDRY, they are not permitted to enter the country to pursue individual cases. An AI delegation did visit the PDRY in 1987, however, to observe a Supreme Court trial, and the delegation met with several senior government ministers during their visit to discuss some of the cases being followed by AI. In its 1989 Report, AI noted that the authorities had provided some information on cases of detention without trial and denied knowledge of others, and failed to confirm three deaths in custody or to explain the circumstances in which they occurred.

Section 5 Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Language, or Social Status

The PDRY is a generally homogeneous society and there are few ethnic or linguistic differences. Political factions are based largely on tribal and regional affiliations. Equality of the sexes is mandated by law.

The postindependence government introduced legislation to emancipate Yemeni women. One 1974 law, modeled after the divorce law of Tunisia, restricted polygamy by requiring the official permission of the court for a second marriage, prohibited child marriages, and provided for a considerable

degree of female protection, including equal rights in divorce. Despite this law, there are still frequent cases of polygamy, child marriage, and arbitrary divorce, especially in the more traditional, rural areas.

Violence against women, including wife beating, doubtless occurs, but there is no information available on its extent.

Section 6 Worker Rights

a. The Right of Association

There are no independent trade or labor organizations. The General Federation of Trade Unions (GFTU), the PDRY's only labor association, is under close YSP control. The GFTU is affiliated with the Communist-controlled World Federation of Trade Unions and with the International Confederation of Arab Trade Unions. The PDRY has ratified Convention 98 on the Right to Organize and Collective Bargaining and the ILO's two forced labor conventions, but not Convention 87 on Freedom of Association. It has been cited by the ILO as not having complied with its obligation to supply reports on ratified conventions in recent years. No information is available on the right to strike.

b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively

The State, through the YSP-controlled unions, purports to represent the rights of workers. There is no collective bargaining, and there are no nongovernmental bodies which address labor grievances. A special export processing zone has been established at Maalla Wharf in the port of Aden. Few PDRY exports have been processed through this zone, however, since January 1986.

c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor

There are no reports of forced or compulsory labor.

d. Minimum Age for Employment of Children

The labor code prohibits the employment of children (defined as between 7 and 12 years of age) and young persons (between 12 and 16 years of age). However, apprentice employment of young persons 14 years and older is permitted. Child labor is common but is more prevalent in rural areas than in cities, where children must compete with adults for scarce jobs. Child labor in rural areas is often in the context of work on family, cooperative, or state farms.

e. Acceptable Conditions of Work

There is some legislation regulating conditions of labor, but there is no mechanism for effective enforcement. Labor legislation is uniform throughout the PDRY but labor practice is not. For example, child labor is common in many rural areas, but not in Aden. Many, perhaps most, PDRY workers are farmers; the majority of these work in state-controlled collectives or associations, while the others, in more isolated rural areas, enjoy a greater degree of independence. The labor code stipulates a 42 hour workweek. Information on whether the labor code provides for a minimum wage is not available. The prevailing daily wage for unskilled labor is about $10.

UNITED
NATIONS

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Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/21294
11 May 1990

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 10 MAY 1990 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF AUSTRIA TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

I have the honour to convey to you on behalf of the troop-contributing countries of UNFICYP the text of a joint letter addressed to you.

I would be grateful if you would arrange to have the text of this letter circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Peter HOHENFELLNER
Ambassador
Permanent Representative of Austria
to the United Nations

Annex

Letter dated 7 May 1990 from the Representatives of Australia, Austria, Canada, Denmark, Finland, Ireland, Sweden and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland addressed to the Secretary-General

We continue to be gravely concerned at the growing deficit in the United Nations Peace-keeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) special account, which places an excessive and wholly unfair financial burden on the countries providing contingents for the Force. In addition to that deficit, those countries in any case under present arrangements bear over 70 per cent of the total cost of the peace-keeping operation. We are most grateful for your efforts in drawing the attention of Member States to this problem, which has serious implications both for UNFICYP itself and for United Nations peace-keeping in general, to which we attach great importance.

We are disappointed that, despite your efforts, there has been a further decline in the level of voluntary contributions to the financing of UNFICYP in the course of last year. According to your latest letter of 1 November 1989 on this subject (S/20933), as of 15 October 1989, the accumulated shortfall in the UNFICYP Special Account for the mandate periods ending 15 December 1989 had reached $US 174.8 million. As a result, the United Nations has been able to meet the claims of troop-contributing countries only up to December 1980.

We believe that there continues to be no alternative to your proposal, which we fully endorse, that the Security Council agree to the financing of the United Nations share of the cost of the Force from assessed contributions. We would therefore appreciate it if you renewed your efforts in this regard. The members of the Security Council have, in the statement of the President of 14 December 1989 (S/21026), taken note of the continuing financial difficulties facing UNFICYP as indicated by you. For our part we shall be making our views known to them.

We would again like to take this opportunity to assure you of our continuing support for your efforts to assist the two sides in reaching a negotiated settlement, and urge them to provide you with their full co-operation in accordance with Security Council resolution 649 (1990) of 12 March 1990.

(Signed) Howard P. BAMSEY
Minister, Chargé d'affaires a.i.
Permanent Mission of Australia

(Signed) Peter HOHENFELLNER
Ambassador
Permanent Representative of Austria

(Signed) L. Yves FORTIER
Ambassador
Permanent Representative of Canada

(Signed) Kjeld V. MORTENSEN
Ambassador
Permanent Representative of Denmark

(Signed) Klaus TORNUDD
Ambassador
Permanent Representative of Finland

(Signed) Francis M. HAYES
Ambassador
Permanent Representative of Ireland

(Signed) Jan ELIASSON
Ambassador
Permanent Representative of Sweden

(Signed) Crispin TICKELL
Ambassador
Permanent Representative of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland

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Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/21295
15 May 1990
ENGLISH
ORIGINAL: FRENCH

LETTER DATED 14 MAY 1990 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF CHAD TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

In response to the ridiculous accusations made in the note of 11 May 1990 addressed to you by the Permanent Representative of Libya to the United Nations, I have the honour to inform you of the following:

Chad, a peace-loving country which abides by its commitments and by international law, objects to and categorically refutes the Libyan representative's shameless allegations and denounces the treachery and contempt repeatedly shown by the Liyban authorities. The manipulative, aggressive and irresponsible language of the Libyan representative's note is a smokescreen and a perfect illustration of the Tripoli Government's far from peaceful intentions. The incoherence, malevolence and virulence of the language should, moreover, surprise no one, for they simply reflect the true nature and irresponsible bahaviour of the Libyan authorities, whose bad faith and desire for domination are a matter of public record. We therefore wish to state in reply that what the Libyan representative in his note calls "a piratical measure" was simply an act of self-defence triggered by an unmistakable Libyan attack for which there is irrefutable evidence. The Libyan note also talks about insecurity in the region. This is quite incredible when one knows that such insecurity is caused by Libya, which sounds the alarm when it is itself the culprit, when it is the aggressor and is using its petrodollars to perpetuate instability among its neighbours in order to satisfy its sordid designs. They shall be known by their actions! Cannot this maxim be applied to Libya, which is still trying to take everyone in by its delaying tactics?

Chad has suffered more than enough from Qaddafi's misdeeds. It will not give in to the threats made by the Libyan authorities and it holds Libya's expansionist régime entirely to blame for the current tensions. While reaffirming its commitment to respect the letter and the spirit of the Algiers framework agreement on the settlement of its dispute with Libya, Chad remains determined to defend its dignity, its sovereignty and its territorial integrity by all available means. Therefore, in a spirit of permanent readiness for dialogue, a Government delegation led by the Minister for Foreign Affairs, Acheikh Ibn Oumar, is travelling to Tripoli on 14 May 1990 to take part in the work of the Chad-Libya Joint Commission.

Lastly, Chad also requests the Security Council to call on the Libyan régime to put an end to its attacks and acts of destabilization against Chad and to abide by the rules of international law.

I should be grateful if you would have this letter and its annex distributed as a document of the Security Council, for inclusion in the Council's continuing file on the Chad-Libya question.

(Signed) Mahamat Ali ADOUM
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

/...

Annex

MEMORANDUM OF 14 MAY 1990

Since 1972 relations between Chad and Libya have been characterized by repeated acts of aggression by Libya against Chad.

In 1972 Libya, taking advantage of the unrest in the Borkou-Ennedi-Tibesti region, laid seige to the town of Aozou, which it occupied militarily. The series of mediation attempts made did not produce any results owing to the treacherous attitude of Libya, which consistently acted deceitfully, advocating dialogue when it had no alternative and reneging on its promises soon afterwards.

The current relations between the two countries provide a perfect example of such treachery.

Following the bloody fighting in 1987 between the Chadian National Armed Forces (FANT) and the Libyan forces of occupation in the Borkou-Ennedi-Tibesti region, Libya as usual embarked on a campaign designed to present an image of moderation to world public opinion.

I. THE ALGIERS AGREEMENTS

It was in these circumstances that on 3 October 1988 diplomatic relations were established between Chad and Libya and on 31 August 1989 a framework agreement to settle the territorial dispute between Chad and Libya was signed by the two countries.

The Algiers Agreement reaffirms the fundamental principles laid down in the United Nations Charter and the Charter of the Organization of African Unity (OAU), and states the following in article 4:

> "The Republic of Chad and the Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya reaffirm their decisions with regard to the cease-fire established between them; they further undertake to desist from any form of hostility and in particular:
>
> (a) To desist from all hostile campaigns in the media;
>
> (b) To refrain from any interference, whether direct or indirect, under any pretext and in any circumstance, in the internal or external affairs of the other country;
>
> (c) To withhold all political, material, financial and military support from forces hostile to either country;
>
> (d) To proceed to the signing of a treaty of friendship, good-neighbourliness and economic and financial co-operation between the two countries."

The implementation of the Agreement, which gave rise to great hopes both internationally and among the Libyan and Chadian peoples, has still not begun.

The one-year period at the end of which the two parties were to submit the territorial dispute to the International Court of Justice will soon have elapsed, while the Libyan leaders set up obstacle after obstacle to observance of the deadline. In addition to the issue of the release of prisoners of war, which Libya has made a prerequisite for implementation of the Agreement of 31 August 1989, just a few months after the signing of the Agreement Libya resumed its acts of aggression against Chad from Sudanese territory.

II. FURTHER LIBYAN ACTS OF AGGRESSION AGAINST CHAD

In October 1989 the reconstituted Libyan Islamic Legion attacked the Chadian National Armed Forces' positions in eastern Chad, along the frontier with the Sudan. In view of the unflinching counter-attack by the Chadian National Armed Forces, the mercenaries in the pay of Libya withdrew into Sudanese territory.

With the active collusion of the Sudanese leaders, these mercenaries, recruited by Libya and protected, financed, equipped and trained by the Libyan special services, reorganized themselves.

On 25 March 1990 they once again attacked Chadian positions along the frontier with the Sudan, particularly the posts at Bahaï, Tina and Iriba, just at the point where the Chad-Libya Joint Commission had finished its work at N'Djamena and the meeting of the OAU Ad Hoc Committee was beginning at Libreville.

The various types of weapons and equipment recovered from the attackers provided irrefutable proof of Libya's involvement in the fighting. Chad demonstrated long ago that the Islamic Legion is no more than a Libyan creation. Accordingly, the Legion is supplied by air and by surface from the Libyan town of Kufra. Supplies are transported into the Sudan by constant truck convoys.

During the fighting between the Chadian National Armed Forces and the mercenaries of the Islamic Legion on the frontier between Chad and the Sudan, a truck convoy was intercepted. It was one of the convoys responsible for providing logistic support to the Islamic Legion and was transporting ammunition and fuel. The trucks were being driven by officers of the Libyan special services and Libyan soldiers disguised as civilians. The ammunition found on board indicated that the trucks certainly did not constitute a civilian convoy, as claimed by the Tripoli régime.

In permitting the Libyans and their mercenaries to use Sudanese territory for the purpose of launching armed attacks against Chad, the Sudanese Government colluded with that act of aggression, the latest in an uninterrupted succession of Libyan acts of aggression against Chad.

As long as such acts of aggression continue, Chad will continue to exercise its legitimate rights under international law in order to guarantee the Chadian populations' security and ensure that its territorial integrity and sovereignty are respected.

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S/21296
15 May 1990

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 15 MAY 1990 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF THE SUDAN TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

I have the honour to transmit herewith, text of an official release issued by the Sudanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Khartoum on the subject of deteriorating relations and acts of aggression and kidnapping of Sudanese and Libyan nationals and looting properties from inside Sudanese territories.

I should be grateful if said document could be circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Amin Magzoub ABDOUN
Permanent Representative

/...

Annex

Release issued on 15 May 1990 by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of the Sudan on the occasion of Chadian military aggression against Sudanese territories and nationals

Sudan has always attached special attention to its relations with neighbouring countries, and with Chad in particular.

Sudan continuously endeavours to find a solution to the conflict in Chad, because of its awareness of the nature of the problem and its keenness to preserve its territorial integrity.

In this respect Sudan took several initiatives to contain the conflict between the Chadian Government and the rebel forces which took refuge in Darfur province after the coup d'etat attempt in N'djamena in April 1989.

On the other hand high ranking Sudanese officials visited Chad on several occasions to reaffirm Sudan's commitment to promote fraternal relations between the two countries. Most recently, a message from Lt. General Omer Hassan Ahmed Elbeshir, President of the Republic of the Sudan was delivered by the Minister of Foreign Affairs. This was followed by a visit to Khartoum by a Chadian delegation.

In spite of all these initiatives and gestures of good will, the Chadian Government launched an unjustified propaganda campaign against Sudan, which was met by self restraint on our part to safeguard the relations between the two countries. However, Chadian regular forces crossed into Sudanese territories for the second time, looting property and abducting Sudanese and Libyan nationals who were on an ordinary trade journey between Alkafra in Libya and Malout in western Sudan.

Sudan calls on the Chadian Government to release all the kidnapped Sudanese and Libyan nationals, to guarantee their safe return with their properties, and to compensate Sudanese nationals who suffered damages.

Sudan also reiterates that it will exercise its full rights of sovereignty and preserve its territorial integrity. Moreover, Sudan Government is keen to maintain good neighbourliness with Chad and reaffirms its readiness to exert utmost efforts to achieve a reconciliation.

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S/21297
16 May 1990

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 16 MAY 1990 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF PAKISTAN TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

I have the honour to forward herewith the text of the letter addressed to you by His Excellency Sahabzada Yaqub-Khan, Foreign Minister of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan.

I should be grateful if you would have this letter and its annex circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Nasim AHMED
Ambassador and
Permanent Representative

Annex

Letter dated 14 May 1990 from the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Pakistan addressed to the President of the Security Council

I have the honour to bring to your urgent attention recent developments in the Indian-occupied Jammu and Kashmir which have created an extremely grave situation, having serious implications for regional peace and security.

2. Indian-occupied Jammu and Kashmir has been in a state of turmoil for more than a year. The people have openly challenged Indian occupation and demanded the free exercise of their right to self-determination recognized by the relevant United Nations resolutions. More recently, the situation has taken a particularly serious turn leading to widespread disturbances in the territory.

3. Unfortunately, the Indian authorities instead of addressing the root-cause of the problem, which is the denial of the right of self-determination to the people of Jammu and Kashmir, have resorted to massive use of force to suppress the uprising. Widespread and frequent incidents of firing by the security forces on unarmed civilians resulting in the tragic loss of human lives continue to be reported from the Indian-occupied Kashmir. During the past few months, over 500 Kashmiris have been shot to death while demonstrating peacefully. Many more have been injured.

4. The Indian-occupied Jammu and Kashmir has been placed under military rule. At present, there are over 200,000 Indian military, paramilitary, security and police forces in the occupied territory. A determined effort is afoot to intimidate and terrorize the population into submission by Draconian measures, including imposition of curfew in all major towns, house-to-house searches, arbitrary detentions, humiliation of civilians and expulsion of foreign correspondents from the State. These measures have, however, failed to erode the resolve of the people of Kashmir to continue their struggle.

5. Many independent observers have recognized the gravity of the situation and have expressed their deep concern. In two messages addressed to the Government of Indian-occupied Kashmir, Amnesty International called for an investigation into the killings of Kashmiri civilians. According to Amnesty International, the demonstrators were unarmed and many of the victims were shot in the head or body while some were shot from behind by the Indian security forces.

6. The reign of terror let loose by the Indian authorities in Kashmir has been severely criticized by men of conscience in India itself. A four-member team on behalf of an Indian Human Rights Group, the Committee for Initiative on Kashmir, during a visit to Jammu and Kashmir from 12 to 18 March 1990, obtained information from a large number of sources, including victims, eyewitnesses as well as senior government officials, about indiscriminate killings, arbitrary arrests, unlawful searches, unprovoked assaults on peaceful demonstrators and a complete dislocation of normal life due to the imposition of indefinite curfew for months with rare breaks of a few hours. In the course of investigation, the team found that these

excesses had been carried out by the official law-enforcement personnel, that is, CRPF (Central Reserve Police Force), BSF (Border Security Force), and in certain cases, by the Indian army.

7. The latest indictment of the gross violations of human rights and atrocities by India appeared in a detailed report on 26 April, compiled by a joint team of the People's Union for Civil Liberties, the Citizens for Democracy, the Radical Humanist Association and the Manav Ekta Abhiyan which visited Srinagar, Jammu and several other towns from 9-13 March and again from 28 March to 3 April 1990. This report provides documentary proof beyond any shadow of doubt that the Indian security forces have been given a free hand to violate every norm of civilized behaviour.

8. India has stepped up its policy of collective punishment against a popular uprising and its repression is no longer confined to towns. Azad Kashmir is beginning to receive an influx of refugees who have brought gruesome stories of Indian atrocities. In recent days, Indian forces have fired on and killed a number of Kashmiris trying to cross over into Azad Kashmir to take refuge. So far about 6,000 Kashmiri refugees have reached Azad Kashmir. Humanitarian assistance is being provided to them by the local authorities. With the melting of snows and reopening of routes, more Kashmiri refugees are likely to cross over into Azad Kashmir to seek asylum from the unprecedented repression.

9. Jammu and Kashmir is a disputed territory and is recognized as such by the United Nations. In a number of resolutions the Security Council has mandated that the final disposition of the State of Jammu and Kashmir should be made in accordance with the will of the people expressed through the democratic method of a free and impartial plebiscite under the auspices of the United Nations. I would like to draw your attention, inter alia, to Security Council resolution 47 (1948) adopted on 21 April 1948, and the resolutions adopted by the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan on 13 August 1948 and 5 January 1949. Both India and Pakistan, as parties to the dispute, are bound by the provisions of these resolutions. These resolutions remain unimplemented because of India's refusal to honour its own solemn pledges to the United Nations and to the people of Jammu and Kashmir.

10. India's claim that the will of the people of Jammu and Kashmir regarding the future status of the territory was determined through elections held under Indian control and that by participating in these elections they voted in favour of accession to India is a pure subterfuge to escape from its international obligations. The Security Council through its resolutions 91 (1951) of 30 March 1951, and 122 (1957) of 24 January 1957, affirmed categorically that any action by the so-called constituent Assembly convened in the Indian-occupied Jammu and Kashmir to determine the future of the territory would not constitute an expression of the will of the people of Jammu and Kashmir through a free and impartial plebiscite under United Nations auspices. Therefore, India's assertion that Jammu and Kashmir is an integral part of India lacks any legal, political or moral justification. The massive uprising in Kashmir is the most forceful and unambiguous rejection of the Indian contention.

11. By the same token, this uprising cannot be termed as "secessionist" as India describes it, since Jammu and Kashmir was never a part of India. The people of Jammu and Kashmir are demanding the free exercise of their sacred and inalienable right to self-determination, to which India is legally, politically and morally committed and through which they will decide the accession of their State.

12. In an effort to distort the realities and to absolve itself of its moral, political and legal responsibilities to allow the holding of a free and impartial plebiscite under United Nations auspices in Jammu and Kashmir, India has alleged Pakistani involvement in the uprising in the territory. We have categorically rejected these baseless allegations.

13. In order to demonstrate its good faith, Pakistan has proposed to India the establishment of a neutral mechanism such as the stationing of impartial international observers or any other such group acceptable to both sides to monitor and investigate allegations of this nature and reach independent conclusions. India has summarily rejected this proposal. Pakistan, however, stands by its proposal and would be prepared to accept any fact-finding mission or other neutral mechanism for this purpose.

14. The brutal suppression of the Kashmiri people has caused deep grief, anguish and indignation throughout Pakistan. None the less, the Government and the people of Pakistan have exercised the utmost restraint in the face of the Indian atrocities against the people of Kashmir. Despite this, the totally baseless Indian accusations of Pakistan's involvement in the uprising in the Indian-occupied Jammu and Kashmir have been accompanied by repeated threats against Pakistan's security by the Indian leaders.

15. Ominous large-scale Indian troop movements have taken place in Kashmir as well as along the Indo-Pakistan border. More recently, the Indian military threat to Pakistan has acquired menacing proportions. In addition to the increased presence of Indian regular troops and para-military forces in Jammu and Kashmir, India has concentrated its forces in the Punjab and Rajasthan. It has deployed the larger part of its strike corps in Rajasthan posing a grave security threat to Pakistan. This is a cause of serious concern to Pakistan and a threat to regional peace and security.

16. Pakistan remains committed to the preservation of peace in South Asia. In an attempt to defuse tensions and to seek a peaceful settlement of the Jammu and Kashmir dispute, on the basis of the relevant United Nations resolutions, Pakistan has expressed its willingness to enter into a constructive dialogue with India. India has not responded positively to these offers of talks on the Jammu and Kashmir dispute, which is recognized as an outstanding problem in the Simla Agreement.

17. I would like to reiterate Pakistan's steadfast commitment to seeking a peaceful settlement of the dispute over Jammu and Kashmir in accordance with the relevant United Nations resolutions. Our position is in harmony with the spirit of the Simla Agreement.

18. The uprising of the people of the Indian-occupied Jammu and Kashmir for the exercise of their inalienable right to self-determination in accordance with the relevant United Nations resolutions deserves the support of the international community. India's continued refusal to honour its obligations under those resolutions and reliance on force to suppress the demand of the people of Jammu and Kashmir to be allowed to determine their destiny freely will merely prolong the agony of the people of Jammu and Kashmir.

19. It is the earnest hope of the Government of Pakistan that Your Excellency and the Security Council, taking cognizance of the threat to peace and security in South Asia, will call upon India to exercise restraint, desist from the suppression of the Kashmiri people, work for a political settlement of the Jammu and Kashmir dispute in accordance with the relevant United Nations resolutions and redeploy its forces to their peacetime locations.

20. I shall be grateful if this letter is circulated as an official document of the Security Council.

Sahabzada YAQUB-KHAN
Foreign Minister

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S/21298
17 May 1990
ENGLISH
ORIGINAL: FRENCH

LETTER DATED 16 MAY 1990 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF CHAD TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

With reference to the letter dated 15 May 1990 from the Permanent Representative of the Sudan to the United Nations issued under the symbol S/21296 on 15 May 1990, I have the honour to inform you that, like the Sudanese Government, the Government of the Republic of Chad places great value on good-neighbourly relations with all the countries on its borders and has great and particular respect for the age-old ties that exist between the Chadian and Sudanese people.

From time immemorial the Government of the Republic of Chad has sought to maintain excellent friendly and fraternal relations with the régimes that have succeeded one another in Khartoum in recent years. In return, Chad would like all its neighbours to demonstrate the same concern for the common welfare of peoples who are linked by historical and geographical ties.

Unfortunately, for some time now, the Sudanese Government has been siding wholeheartedly with the expansionist Tripoli régime and has been making the frontier province of Darfour available to the Islamic legion, a creation of Qaddafi, for armed attacks on Chad. Nothing has come of the many delegations exchanged between the two countries because the Sudanese Government, under false pretences, has been evading its responsibilities.

On 25 March 1990, the Islamic legion launched an attack from Darfour on several positions of the Chadian National Armed Forces (FANT) all along the Chad-Sudan frontier. Having been thus attacked by mercenaries in Libya's pay, Chad was merely defending itself by pursuing the enemy so as to prevent any repetition of such attacks.

It was during these engagements that the Chadian National Armed Forces intercepted a convoy carrying ammunition and fuel supplies intended for the Islamic legion and led by agents of the Libyan special services and Libyan soldiers disguised as civilians.

Contrary to the allegations of the Government of the Sudan, which instead of blindly supporting the Libyan position should have acted responsibly and placed the facts in their context, no Sudanese citizen was kidnapped and no village in Darfour

was looted. The Chadian National Armed Forces are made up of respectable and very patriotic men and they would not stoop so low as to loot the very meagre resources of poor villagers. It is therefore pointless to try to sully the reputation of the fearless FANT fighters who, in pursuing the enemy were simply doing their duty and upholding the peace and security of the nation which was again being threatened by Qaddafi's savage hordes.

Chad insists that its dignity and territorial integrity must be respected and, with that in mind, it will exercise all the rights available to it under international law to crush any aggression and any attack on its security.

It goes without saying that the Chadian Government will continue to talk with the Sudanese authorities with a view to preserving the long-standing ties that unite the Chadian and Sudanese peoples, maintaining excellent good-neighbourly relations between the two brotherly countries and, above all, putting an end to the acts of aggression launched by Libya against Chad from the Sudanese province of Darfour.

I should be grateful if you could have this letter circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Mahamat ALI ADOUM
Ambassador, Permanent Representative

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S/21299
18 May 1990
ENGLISH
ORIGINAL: ARABIC

LETTER DATED 17 MAY 1990 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF THE LIBYAN ARAB JAMAHIRIYA TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

With reference to our letter No. 837 dated 11 May 1990 addressed to you, I should be grateful if you would have that text circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Ali A. TREIKI
Permanent Representative

Annex

Letter dated 11 May 1990 from the Permanent Representative of the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council

I wish to inform you that the armed forces of the Chadian Government have intercepted Libyan transport trucks operating within the framework of transportation services between Libya and the Sudan. As these trucks were on the way back to Libya, they were subjected to armed aggression in the territory of the Sudan in an area more than 40 kilometres from Chadian territory and inside Sudanese territory.

This piratical measure on the part of the N'Djamena Government authorities seriously endangers peace and security in the region and demonstrates once again the degree to which the N'Djamena authorities flout all international pacts and customs. The N'Djamena authorities were not content with this blatant aggression against civilian means of transportation. President Habré, as a part of his campaign of aggression against Libya, has tried to make that a means of deceiving public opinion inside and outside Chad. It is alleged, inter alia, that there is Libyan intervention in the fighting in Chad.

Libya, in its desire for peace and stability in the region, applies to you for the adoption of the necessary measures to ensure the release of the drivers and passengers of the trucks and the immediate return of the trucks and their loads to the Jamahiriya. We ask that an end be put to these grave and irresponsible infractions on the part of the N'Djamena authorities, which must bear the full responsibility and punish those responsible for this criminal act.

We reaffirm our full desire to have nothing occur that might increase the tension in the region, and we have expressed our readiness to resolve the problems through negotiation and within the framework of good-neighbourliness and co-operation. We hope that Libya will not find itself obliged to take measures to ensure that its citizens and its civilian transportation are not subjected to such terrorist acts.

(Signed) Ali A. TREIKI
Permanent Representative

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S/21300
21 May 1990
ENGLISH
ORIGINAL: ARABIC

LETTER DATED 21 MAY 1990 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF BAHRAIN TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

In my capacity as Chairman of the Arab Group for the month of May 1990 and on behalf of the members of this Group, I have the honour to request the convening of an immediate meeting of the Security Council to consider the crime of collective murder committed by Israel against the Palestinian people.

(Signed) Karim Ebrahim AL-SHAKAR
Ambassador
Permanent Representative of
Bahrain to the United Nations
Chairman of the Arab Group

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S/21301
21 May 1990

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 16 MAY 1990 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF AUSTRIA TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

I have the honour to convey to you on behalf of the troop-contributing countries of the United Nations Peace-keeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) the text of a joint letter addressed to you.

I would be grateful if you would arrange to have the text of this letter circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Peter HOHENFELLNER
Ambassador
Permanent Representative of Austria
to the United Nations

Annex

Letter dated 14 May 1990 from the representatives of Australia, Austria, Canada, Denmark, Finland, Ireland, Sweden and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland addressed to the President of the Security Council

As troop contributors to the United Nations Peace-keeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP), we wish to convey to you again our continuing concern at the massive and increasing shortfall in the voluntary contributions required to provide the Force with adequate funding. In his latest report of 7 December 1989 on this subject (S/21010), the Secretary-General observes that the accumulated deficit on the UNFICYP Special Account is estimated to be over $US 174 million. The burden of this deficit falls entirely on the handful of troop-contributing countries, which in any case claim reimbursement on average for only less than one third of the costs they actually incur through their provision of contingents.

The Secretary-General also remarks in his report that UNFICYP has continued to fulfil its functions in an exemplary manner, often under difficult conditions, and that its presence in Cyprus remains indispensable. While welcoming the Security Council's decision to extend the mandate of the Force, we are compelled to make clear that the highly unsatisfactory financial situation cannot go on indefinitely.

The responsibilities assumed by the Security Council in respect of UNFICYP are not confined to the renewal of the mandate. The provision of a sound financial basis for the operation of the Force will ensure that it can continue to contribute to the maintenance of the conditions necessary for a negotiated settlement between the two sides in Cyprus through the Secretary-General's mission of good offices for which the Security Council expressed its full support in resolution 649 (1990) as recently as on 12 March 1990.

In the statement made by the President on their behalf on 14 December 1989 (S/21026), the members of the Security Council took note of the continuing financial difficulties facing UNFICYP. In the absence of adequate voluntary contributions to UNFICYP, we believe there can be no alternative to the provision of funding through assessed contributions by all Member States. The Security Council, and its permanent members in particular, have a special responsibility to ensure proper financing for the United Nations share of the costs of UNFICYP, as for all peace-keeping operations authorized by the Council.

We would now expect the members of the Security Council to accept this - in the words of the Secretary-General's report - overdue reform and to agree to the funding of UNFICYP through assessed contributions.

(Signed) Peter S. WILENSKI
Ambassador
Permanent Representative
of Australia

(Signed) Peter HOHENFELLNER
Ambassador
Permanent Representative
of Austria

(Signed) Philippe KIRSCH
Ambassador, Chargé d'affaires a.i.
Permanent Mission of Canada

(Signed) Klaus TÖRNUDD
Ambassador
Permanent Representative of Finland

(Signed) Rolf ANDREEN
Minister, Chargé d'affaires a.i.
Permanent Mission of Sweden

(Signed) Kjeld V. MORTENSEN
Ambassador
Permanent Representative
of Denmark

(Signed) Francis M. HAYES
Ambassador
Permanent Representative
of Ireland

(Signed) Crispin TICKELL
Ambassador
Permanent Representative of
the United Kingdom of
Great Britain and Northern
Ireland

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Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/21302
21 May 1990
ENGLISH
ORIGINAL: ARABIC

LETTER DATED 21 MAY 1990 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF IRAQ TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

On instruction from my Government I have the honour to inform you that the Iranian armed forces have committed the following violations of the cease-fire provisions:

1. At 1120 hours on 1 May 1990, the Iranians proceeded to roof a post and man it with three personnel at co-ordinates 493137, 700 metres from our II Army Corps units.

2. At 0730 hours on 1 May 1990, an Iranian engineering unit consisting of a Poclain excavator and three dump trucks was seen carrying earth from the spit in no man's land to the first Iranian embankment at co-ordinates 941802, 300 metres from our III Army Corps units.

3. At 0950 hours on 1 May 1990, the Iranians built a guard post of sheet iron at co-ordinates 640386, 400 metres from our IV Army Corps units.

4. At 0925 hours on 1 May 1990, a group of Iranians, estimated to number 15, with a bulldozer and nine dump trucks was seen mending the rampart at co-ordinates 581599, 1,330 metres from our VI Army Corps units.

5. At 0700 hours on 1 May 1990, an Iranian engineering unit consisting of a bulldozer and nine dump trucks was seen strengthening an embankment at co-ordinates 649161, 1,100 metres from our VII Army Corps units.

6. At 0925 hours on 1 May 1990, an Iranian engineering unit consisting of a bulldozer and five dump trucks was seen carrying earth to the embankment at co-ordinates 367595, 600 metres from our VII Army Corps units.

7. At 1020 hours on 1 May 1990, a hoist was seen lowering three semicircular pre-cast concrete shelter sections at co-ordinates 308591, 700 metres from our VII Army Corps units.

8. At 1205 hours on 1 May 1990, a hoist was seen lowering five semicircular concrete shelter sections at co-ordinates 303631, 800 metres from our VII Army Corps units.

9. At 1800 hours on 1 May 1990, the Iranians pitched a tent with a green-coloured flag on hill 1756 at co-ordinates 706626, 1,500 metres from our I Army Corps units, bringing the number of tents pitched on the hill to three.

10. At 0750 hours on 2 May 1990, for the second consecutive day, the Iranians' engineering operations, employing eight dump trucks, an excavator and two bulldozers, continued on the northern drainage dam in no man's land at co-ordinates 583599, 1,330 metres from our VI Army Corps units. The Iranians built two earth mounds at co-ordinates 583599 and 584598.

11. At 0630 hours on 2 May 1990, an Iranian engineering unit consisting of an excavator and 10 dump trucks was seen strengthening an embankment at co-ordinates 681154, 1,400 metres from our VII Army Corps units.

12. At 0750 hours on 2 May 1990, an Iranian engineering unit consisting of an excavator and four dump trucks was seen strengthening an embankment at co-ordinates 547241, 800 metres from our VII Army Corps units.

13. At 1050 hours on 2 May 1990, an Iranian engineering unit consisting of four dump trucks was seen carrying earth from the Iranian rear to the embankment at co-ordinates 362595, 600 metres from our VII Army Corps units.

14. At 1150 hours on 2 May 1990, an Iranian bulldozer was seen levelling an embankment at co-ordinates 363595, 600 metres from our VII Army Corps units.

15. At 1015 hours on 3 May 1990, two Iranian bulldozers were seen strengthening the spit extending from the Iranian rampart to the Iranian monitoring post at co-ordinates 920971, 2,400 metres from our III Army Corps units.

16. On 3 May 1990, for the third consecutive day, the Iranian engineering operations, employing nine dump trucks, two excavators and two bulldozers continued on the northern drainage dam in no man's land at co-ordinates 583599, 1,330 metres from our VI Army Corps units.

17. At 0945 hours on 3 May 1990, an Iranian helicopter was seen flying at a low altitude, and probably landing for five minutes, at Ra's Abadan at co-ordinates 695175, 4,000 metres from our VII Army Corps units.

18. At 0700 hours on 3 May 1990, an Iranian engineering unit consisting of an excavator, a grader and eight dump trucks was seen strengthening the embankment at co-ordinates 682154, 1,400 metres from our VII Army Corps units.

19. At 0715 hours on 3 May 1990, an Iranian engineering unit consisting of two excavators and ten dump trucks was seen strengthening the embankment at co-ordinates 547250, 800 metres from our VII Army Corps units.

20. At 1700 hours on 3 May 1990, an Iranian hoist was seen moving concrete sections from the rear to co-ordinates 638162, 1,200 metres from our VII Army Corps units.

21. At 0900 hours on 3 May 1990, an Iranian engineering unit consisting of two rollers, a bulldozer and 11 dump trucks was seen carrying earth from the rear to the road parallel to the Shatt al-Arab at co-ordinates 496454, 600 metres from our VII Army Corps units.

22. At 0900 hours on 3 May 1990, two dump trucks were seen carrying earth from the Iranian rear to the forward embankment at co-ordinates 369594, 600 metres from our VII Army Corps units.

23. At 0920 hours on 3 May 1990, an Iranian engineering unit consisting of a bulldozer and five dump trucks was seen carrying earth from the rear to the forward embankment near the Abadan refineries at co-ordinates 404566, 700 metres from our VII Army Corps units.

24. At 1100 hours on 3 May 1990, an Iranian engineering unit consisting of an excavator, two rollers and three dump trucks was seen mending the embankment at co-ordinates 232725, 800 metres from our VII Army Corps units.

25. At 1800 hours on 3 May 1990, the Iranians constructed a guard post of sandbags on the first Iranian embankment at co-ordinates 921861, 900 metres from our III Army Corps units.

26. At 0840 hours on 4 May 1990, eight Iranians were observed building a reed hut north of Musian at co-ordinates 247029, 2,500 metres from our IV Army Corps units.

27. At 0950 hours on 4 May 1990, 25 Iranians were observed building a mud hut east of Musian at co-ordinates 257003, 1,000 metres from our IV Army Corps units.

28. On 4 May 1990, for the fourth consecutive day, the Iranian engineering operations, employing eight dump trucks, an excavator and two bulldozers, continued on the northern drainage dam in no man's land at co-ordinates 583599, 1,330 metres from our VI Army Corps units.

29. At 0725 hours on 4 May 1990, an Iranian engineering unit consisting of an excavator and five dump trucks was seen raising the height of an embankment at co-ordinates 547250, 650 metres from our VII Army Corps units.

30. At 1100 hours on 4 May 1990, the Iranians built three observation posts of blocks on the Iranian embankment north of the Karun river, the first, which was equipped with a BKC machine-gun, at co-ordinates 279693, the second at co-ordinates 276695 and the third at co-ordinates 276694, 600 metres from our VII Army Corps units. Each post was 1 metre high and 1.5 metres wide.

31. On 5 May 1990, for the fifth consecutive day, the Iranian engineering operations, employing eight dump trucks, an excavator and two bulldozers, continued on the northern drainage dam in no man's land at co-ordinates 583599, 1,330 metres from our VI Army Corps units.

32. At 0900 hours on 5 May 1990, an Iranian engineering unit consisting of an excavator, a grader, a roller, a bulldozer and 10 dump trucks was seen completing the embankment at co-ordinates 547239, 1,300 metres from our VII Army Corps units.

33. At 0815 hours on 5 May 1990, an Iranian excavator was seen levelling an embankment at co-ordinates 361596, 600 metres from our VII Army Corps units.

34. At 0820 hours on 5 May 1990, an Iranian roller was seen levelling the embankment at co-ordinates 369594, 600 metres from our VII Army Corps units.

35. At 0845 hours on 5 May 1990, an Iranian engineering unit consisting of five dump trucks was seen carrying earth from the forward embankment at co-ordinates 366595, 700 metres from our VII Army Corps units.

36. At 1010 hours on 5 May 1990, the Iranians built three two-metre-wide and one-metre-high guard posts of blocks north of the Karun river. They were placed 200 metres apart, the first at co-ordinates 277699, the second at co-ordinates 267704, and the third at co-ordinates 269703, 700 metres from our VII Army Corps units. A guard was stationed at each post, and a khaki-coloured vehicle was seen from which an individual alighted, who marked the positions that had been built.

37. At 1200 hours on 6 May 1990, an Iranian excavator proceeded to build a 2-metre-high and 350- to 400-metre-long earth embankment inside the Iranian positions at co-ordinates 726300, 3,500 metres from our II Army Corps units.

38. On 6 May 1990, for the sixth consecutive day, the Iranians continued the operations of the engineering unit consisting of eight dump trucks, two excavators and two bulldozers on the northern drainage dam in no man's land at co-ordinates 584598, 1,330 metres from our VI Army Corps units.

39. At 0710 hours on 6 May 1990, an Iranian engineering unit consisting of an excavator, a grader and eight dump trucks was seen raising the height of an embankment at co-ordinates 665156, 1,000 metres from our VII Army Corps units.

40. At 1215 hours on 6 May 1990, a small Iranian boat was seen coming from a tributary carrying two military personnel at co-ordinates 612168, 700 metres from our VII Army Corps units.

41. At 0920 hours on 6 May 1990, three Iranian civilians were seen doing maintenance work on the anchorage near the Abadan refineries at co-ordinates 408558, 700 metres from our VII Army Corps units.

42. At 1030 hours on 6 May 1990, an Iranian engineering unit consisting of five dump trucks and two tractor-trailers, the first carrying nine semicircular concrete shelter sections and the second carrying six sections, was seen carrying and then unloading the sections on the embankment at co-ordinates 366545, 600 metres from our VII Army Corps units.

43. At 1530 hours on 6 May 1990, the Iranians built a shelter on the slope of hill 1238 inside the Iranian positions at co-ordinates 468848, 2,000 metres from our I Army Corps units.

44. At 1105 hours on 7 May 1990, 18 Iranians were seen digging a 20-metre-long communications trench, in addition to the old trench, south-west of hill 1241 and inside the Iranian positions at co-ordinates 344817, 1,500 metres from our II Army Corps units.

45. At 1830 hours on 7 May 1990, the Iranians built a 1-metre-high and 1.5-metre-wide firing position made of sandbags and roofed with corrugated iron on the first embankment at co-ordinates 938844, 500 metres from our III Army Corps units.

46. At 1245 hours on 7 May 1990, four Iranians were observed building a shelter of sandbags north of Saddamiyah at co-ordinates 771212, 5,000 metres from our IV Army Corps units.

47. On 7 May 1990, for the seventh consecutive day, the Iranian engineering operations, employing seven dump trucks, an excavator and two bulldozers, continued on the northern drainage dam in no man's land at co-ordinates 584598, 1,230 metres from our VI Army Corps units.

48. At 0730 hours on 7 May 1990, an Iranian engineering unit consisting of 15 dump trucks and a grader was seen strengthening a road at co-ordinates 569198, 700 metres from our VII Army Corps units.

49. At 1640 hours on 7 May 1990, two Iranians were seen fishing at co-ordinates 544222, 400 metres from our VII Army Corps units.

50. At 0430 hours on 7 May 1990, a force from the Iranian side, estimated to number 22 men, advanced on our units' positions at co-ordinates 1356 and opened fire with light and medium weapons in the direction of our units inside Iraqi territory for 20 minutes and then stopped. This took place 1,000 metres from our I Army Corps units.

51. At 1100 hours on 8 May 1990, the Iranians pitched a tent on the left slope of hill 1756 opposite our units at co-ordinates 706646, 1,500 metres from our I Army Corps units, bringing the number of tents pitched on the hill to four.

52. At 0900 hours on 8 May 1990, the Iranians proceeded to extend by 150 metres the length of the old trench in front of the first embankment at co-ordinates 712283, 1,500 metres from our II Army Corps units.

53. At 0920 hours on 8 May 1990, 25 Iranians dug a 15-metre-long and 1-metre-wide communications trench in the first embankment at co-ordinates 928871, 1,600 metres from our III Army Corps units.

54. At 0935 hours on 8 May 1990, the Iranians built a guard post made of sandbags and roofed with corrugated iron on the first embankment at co-ordinates 928859, 750 metres from our III Army Corps units.

55. At 0935 hours on 8 May 1990, the Iranians set up a BKC machine-gun at the monitoring post in no man's land at co-ordinates 940809, 170 metres from our III Army Corps units.

56. At 1600 hours on 8 May 1990, four Iranians were observed building a firing position behind the east bank of the Doveyrich river, 1,500 metres from our IV Army Corps units.

57. At 1600 hours on 8 May 1990, for the eighth consecutive day, the Iranian engineering operations, employing nine dump trucks, an excavator and two bulldozers, continued on the northern drainage dam in no man's land at co-ordinates 584598, 1,330 metres from our VI Army Corps units.

58. At 0700 hours on 8 May 1990, an Iranian engineering unit consisting of seven dump trucks and a roller was seen strengthening an embankment at co-ordinates 621170, 1,100 metres from our VII Army Corps units.

59. At 0730 hours on 8 May 1990, three Iranian dump trucks were seen strengthening an embankment at co-ordinates 681153, 1,400 metres from our VII Army Corps units.

60. At 1730 hours on 8 May 1990, an Iranian engineering unit consisting of an excavator and three dump trucks was seen strengthening an embankment at co-ordinates 680153, 1,300 metres from our VII Army Corps units.

61. At 1730 hours on 8 May 1990, three Iranians were seen swimming in the Shatt al-Arab at co-ordinates 544258, 400 metres from our VII Army Corps units.

62. At 0935 hours on 8 May 1990, an Iranian excavator was seen making an opening in the embankment near the Abadan refineries at co-ordinates 392578, 900 metres from our VII Army Corps units.

63. At 1615 hours on 8 May 1990, six Iranian tractor-trailers were seen carrying 28 rectangular concrete shelter sections, lowering 17 sections at co-ordinates 378594, 900 metres from our VII Army Corps units, and lowering the rest nearby.

64. At 1600 hours on 8 May 1990, a number of Iranians were seen on hill 2203 setting up and constructing a single-barrel machine-gun position at co-ordinates 310960, 1,000 metres from our V Army Corps units.

65. At 1100 hours on 9 May 1990, the Iranians pitched two tents on the left slope of hill 1756, the first at co-ordinates 709647 and the second at co-ordinates 715648, 1,500 metres from our I Army Corps units.

66. At 1245 hours on 9 May 1990, five Iranians built a rest shelter at co-ordinates 608402, 500 metres from our II Army Corps units.

67. At 1630 hours on 9 May 1990, eight Iranians built a rest shelter of blocks near the Iranian post at co-ordinates 569485, 600 metres from our II Army Corps units.

68. At 1800 hours on 9 May 1990, 10 Iranians built a shelter of sandbags at co-ordinates 862214, 200 to 300 metres from our II Army Corps units.

69. At 0900 hours on 9 May 1990, the Iranians built two positions at an Iranian monitoring post in no man's land at co-ordinates 920972, 800 metres from our III Army Corps units.

70. At 1000 hours on 9 May 1990, a group of Iranians were observed building a rest shelter of mud behind the east bank of the Doveyrich river west of Rakkas at co-ordinates 317953, 2,000 metres from our IV Army Corps units.

71. On 9 May 1990, for the ninth consecutive day, the Iranian engineering operations, employing 10 dump trucks, two bulldozers and an excavator, continued on the northern drainage dam in no man's land at co-ordinates 584598, 1,330 metres from our VI Army Corps units.

72. At 1240 hours on 9 May 1990, a group of Iranians, estimated to number seven, built a shelter of sandbags at co-ordinates 593613, 3,075 metres from our VI Army Corps units.

73. At 1230 hours on 9 May 1990, four Iranians were seen fishing at co-ordinates 577191, 600 metres from our VII Army Corps units.

74. At 0810 hours on 9 May 1990, an Iranian engineering unit consisting of eight dump trucks, a bulldozer and a roller was seen strengthening an embankment at co-ordinates 278694, 600 metres from our VII Army Corps units.

75. At 0845 hours on 9 May 1990, an Iranian engineering unit consisting of three dump trucks, a bulldozer and a tanker truck was seen strengthening an embankment at co-ordinates 353594, 600 metres from our VII Army Corps units.

76. At 1310 hours on 9 May 1990, five Iranians were seen building a position on the slope of hill 1238 at co-ordinates 468848, 1,500 metres from our I Army Corps units.

77. At 1615 hours on 9 May 1990, 11 Iranians were seen digging a 10-metre-long communications trench, in addition to the previous trench, west of Tit Ya'in at co-ordinates 344821, 1,500 metres from our I Army Corps units.

78. At 1200 hours on 9 May 1990, 10 Iranians were seen digging a position to the left of hill 1238 at co-ordinates 468848, 1,500 metres from our I Army Corps units.

79. At 1045 hours on 10 May 1990, 15 Iranians were seen digging a communications trench west of Tit Ya'in at co-ordinates 344821, 1,500 metres from our I Army Corps units. They dispersed when they noticed the international observers approaching them. The completed work measured 3 metres.

80. At 1030 hours on 10 May 1990, the Iranians opened up a new post, which they manned with a number of personnel, inside their positions at co-ordinates 495096, 700 to 800 metres from our II Army Corps units.

81. At 1100 hours on 10 May 1990, an Iranian glider was seen spraying pesticides in the direction of the Kuwaykat area at co-ordinates 749248, 3,500 metres from our II Army Corps units.

82. At 1030 hours on 10 May 1990, two groups of Iranians, each consisting of nine men, were observed building two mud huts east of Musian at co-ordinates 257003, 1,000 metres from our IV Army Corps units.

83. At 1600 hours on 10 May 1990, for the tenth consecutive day, the engineering operations, employing seven dump trucks, an excavator and two bulldozers, continued on the northern drainage dam in no man's land at co-ordinates 584598, 1,330 metres from our VI Army Corps units.

84. At 1110 hours on 10 May 1990, an Iranian engineering unit consisting of two dump trucks, an excavator and a bulldozer was seen improving defensive positions in the Curve area at co-ordinates 588717, 1,800 metres from our VI Army Corps units.

85. At 0715 hours on 10 May 1990, an Iranian engineering unit consisting of four dump trucks, a grader, a bulldozer and two rollers was seen mending the embankment at co-ordinates 276695, 500 metres from VII Army Corps units.

86. At 1800 hours on 10 May 1990, an Iranian hoist was seen setting up pre-cast concrete shelter sections at co-ordinates 251713, 600 metres from our VII Army Corps units.

87. At 1305 hours on 10 May 1990, nine Iranians were seen digging a communications trench around the Iranian mound on the left slope of hill 2039 at co-ordinates 737642, 3,000 metres from our I Army Corps units. The completed work measured 9 metres.

88. At 1005 hours on 10 May 1990, three Iranians dug a 4- to 5-metre-long slit trench at co-ordinates 62875, 400 metres from our II Army Corps units.

89. At 2000 hours on 10 May 1990, the Iranians set up a Dushka machine-gun at co-ordinates 102675, 1,000 metres from our II Army Corps units.

Flooding operation

The Iranian side is continuing its flooding operation in the direction of our III Army Corps opposite the defensive positions of our military units. The water levels have been as follows:

90. 1 May 1990

Between co-ordinates 678327 and 902203, 0-85 centimetres;
Between co-ordinates 902203 and 902904, 30-150 centimetres;
Between co-ordinates 902904 and 989731, 3-125 centimetres.

91. 2 May 1990

Between co-ordinates 678327 and 902203, 0-85 centimetres;
Between co-ordinates 902203 and 902904, 20-150 centimetres;
Between co-ordinates 902904 and 989731, 3-120 centimetres.

92. 3 May 1990

Between co-ordinates 678327 and 902203, 0-85 centimetres;
Between co-ordinates 902203 and 902904, 20-155 centimetres;
Between co-ordinates 902904 and 989731, 3-120 centimetres.

93. 4 May 1990

Between co-ordinates 678327 and 902203, 0-95 centimetres;
Between co-ordinates 902203 and 902904, 20-150 centimetres;
Between co-ordinates 902904 and 989731, 3-120 centimetres.

94. 5 May 1990

Between co-ordinates 678327 and 902203, 0-95 centimetres;
Between co-ordinates 902203 and 902904, 20-150 centimetres;
Between co-ordinates 902904 and 989731, 3-125 centimetres.

95. 6 May 1990

Between co-ordinates 678327 and 902203, 0-105 centimetres;
Between co-ordinates 902203 and 902904, 20-150 centimetres;
Between co-ordinates 902904 and 989731, 10-125 centimetres.

96. 7 May 1990

Between co-ordinates 678327 and 902203, 0-95 centimetres;
Between co-ordinates 902203 and 902904, 20-150 centimetres;
Between co-ordinates 902904 and 989731, 3-125 centimetres.

97. 8 May 1990

Between co-ordinates 678327 and 902203, 5-105 centimetres;
Between co-ordinates 902203 and 902904, 20-150 centimetres;
Between co-ordinates 902904 and 989731, 3-125 centimetres.

98. 9 May 1990

Between co-ordinates 678327 and 902203, 0-105 centimetres;
Between co-ordinates 902203 and 902904, 20-150 centimetres;
Between co-ordinates 902904 and 989731, 9-125 centimetres.

99. 10 May 1990

Between co-ordinates 678327 and 902203, 0-105 centimetres;
Between co-ordinates 902203 and 902904, 20-150 centimetres;
Between co-ordinates 902904 and 989731, 3-125 centimetres.

I should be grateful if you would have this letter circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Abdul Amir A. AL-ANBARI
Ambassador
Permanent Representative